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This essay critically reviews the most important highlights of the literature on free will in 
Buddhist philosophy. The Buddha and most subsequent Buddhist philosophers apparently 
lacked the free will concept, operating within an impersonal framework orthogonal to the 
free will discussion. As Western philosophy embraces subpersonal conceptions of mind 
and action informing Buddhism from its inception, however, Buddhism may enrich the 
Western discussion of free will. Buddhist scholars have only begun to discuss free will 
over the past 50 years. Nonetheless because Buddhism lacks the free will concept, its 
texts underdetermine what may be said about it, and thus interpretations of the implicit 
role of free will in Buddhist thought diverge. 
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14.1. Introduction 
The Buddha and subsequent Buddhist philosophers (until very recently) apparently 
lacked the concept of free will (Garfield, 2014/2016; Flanagan, 2016; Meyers, 2014),2 
operating within an ultimately impersonal framework orthogonal to the free will 
discussion (Heim, 2014), if not diametrically opposed to it (Garfield, 2014/2016; 
Flanagan, 2016). However, as Western science and philosophy increasingly embrace 
subpersonal conceptions of mind and action (Caruso, 2013), conceptions that have 
informed Buddhism from its inception (Garfield, 2015), Buddhism may have much to 
offer the discussion of free will (Repetti, 2016c). However, because Buddhism lacks the 
free will concept, its texts underdetermine what may be said about free will from a 
Buddhist perspective. Consequently Buddhist exegetical attempts to extract what may be 
implicit about free will in Buddhism diverge. In this paper I critically review the bulk of 
the extant literature on Buddhist thought about free will and argue against the view that 
drawing Buddhism into the free will discussion is ill-advised.4 
Until recently Buddhism has remained silent about free will (Siderits, 1987; 
Goodman, 2002; Harvey, 2007; Adam, 2010; Federman, 2010; Garfield, 2014/2016; 
Gowans, 2014, 2016; Meyers, 2014; Flanagan, 2016). One reason, among many, is that 
Buddhism rejects the ultimate reality of an agent or self (Siderits, 2003), and its goal is 
the realization of that impersonal reality.6 Thus the question whether the agent/self is 
autonomous cannot arise.7 Nonetheless the Buddha ridiculed the ideas of inevitable 
causation by fate, chance, gods, matter, and/or karma (Harvey, 2007; Federman, 2010; 
Wallace, 2011/2016), all considered opposite free will, and he prescribed a path 
promising to increase our abilities to make wise choices (Wallace, 2011/2016), 
completely control our own minds (Meyers, 2014), and attain the maximum of mental 
freedom, nirvāṇa (Repetti, 2010b, 2015). While “free will” talk runs orthogonally to the 
impersonal features of the Buddhist framework (Heim, 2014), the Buddha’s rejection of 
inevitable causation affords Buddhism a solid warrant in the discussion. 
However, because Buddhism is designed to eradicate the false sense of agency 
presupposed in free will discussions, some see the project of engaging Buddhism and 
Western philosophy in discourse on free will as misguided (Flanagan, 2016; Garfield, 
2014/2016). Most Buddhists writing on the subject reject the strong view of free will 
embraced by some forms of libertarianism, according to which an immaterial autonomous 
agent/self exists outside the causal nexus, immune to material influences, able to interject 
phenomenal causes into the empirical realm—a kind of mini prime-mover-unmoved.8 
Clearly, in rejecting the agent/self, the Buddha implicitly rejected this idea,9 as have 
others (Goodman, 2002; Adam, 2010), but this strikes me as the lowest-hanging fruit in 
this domain, so to speak. More subtly, others have claimed that while ultimately there is 
no self in Buddhism, conventionally there is agential functionality sufficient to ground a 
weaker, naturalistic conception of agency/self and free will (Federman, 2010; Harvey, 
2007; Gier & Kjellberg, 2004; Meyers, 2014, 2016; Repetti, 2010b, 2015, 2016b, 2016c; 
Siderits, 1987, 2008/2016; Wallace, 2011/2016). But what might that be? Many of the 
answers to that question overlap, so as we proceed, my descriptions of them will decrease 
in detail as they refer increasingly to ideas spelled out in earlier iterations. 
14.2. Friquegnon: Three Buddhist Conceptions of Freedom 
Just as there are different free will conceptions in Western philosophy, Marie Friquegnon 
(2016) argues that there are three distinct understandings of freedom in various forms of 
Buddhism. First, all Buddhists understand agency as unconstrained by divine power or 
material causality. As mentioned earlier, the Buddha’s rejection of inevitable causation 
(also by fate and chance) established a Buddhist warrant in this discussion (Harvey, 2007; 
Federman, 2010; Wallace, 2011/2016; see also Repetti, 2010b). While material causality 
and fate are not identical with determinism, they share inevitablism,10 and chance implies 
indeterminism. Garfield (2014/2016) and Flanagan (2016) seem to overlook this when 
they argue that Buddhism should not participate in the free will discussion (see also 
Heim, 2014). 
Second, Friquegnon (2016) adds, all Buddhists see unethical actions as the direct 
result of mental states governed by anger/hatred, jealousy/attachment, and ignorance/fear. 
For instance, the Mahāyāna philosopher Śāntideva asserts in the Bodhicaryāvatāra that 
we can no more blame someone under the impersonally caused influence of such mental 
states than we can blame fire for causing smoke. This suggests a causal explanation of 
actions as undermining an agential type of proximal control and implies a sense of 
unfreedom or mental bondage, the eradication of which is the goal of the Buddhist path 
and implies that its elimination is possible and constitutes another form of freedom. As 
Mark Siderits (2008/2016, citing Bodhicaryāvatāra 6:22–32) has emphasized, in the 
same passage Śāntideva suggests the aspirant, aware of this causality, can alter it. As 
Meyers (2014) notes, path progress cultivates this sort of self-control. 
Many agree with and develop this conception (Federman, 2010; Harvey, 2007, 
2016; Meyers, 2016; Wallace, 2011/2016; Repetti, 2010b, 2015, 2016c). Thus the ārya 
(advanced practitioner), in practicing self-monitoring, restraint of desires, and various 
forms of self-regulation, cultivates an increasingly effective will of the sort she prefers to 
have, that is, a dharmic will (a will in accord with the dharma).11 This involves 
increasingly effective proximal control but does not imply a substantive metaphysical 
conception of agency—only an empirical, psychological conception. As Aaronson (2004) 
notes, appealing to the Buddhist “two truths” doctrine (in which conventional truth 
permits pragmatic discourse that is ultimately false or misleading, unlike ultimate 
truth),12 conventional agency increases inversely with the ārya’s realization of the 
ultimate ontological insubstantiality of her self. 
Friquegnon’s (2016) third concept of freedom, unlike Śāntideva’s deterministic 
attitude about impersonally caused behavior in unenlightened beings, involves actions 
flowing from enlightened beings who embody the realization of the insubstantial/empty 
nature of agency/self. Their ego-less behavior is free of all forms of mental conditioning 
but poses a puzzle for discussion of free will. For Western thinking about free will 
typically involves an ability possessed by persons (metaphysically substantive agents). 
How this “agentless agency” (Repetti, 2010b; see also Repetti, 2016a) ought to be 
related to free will is a puzzle, addressed by most thinkers reviewed here only in 
minimalistic, metaphorical terms, if that (e.g., Aaronson, 2004; Adam, 2010; Meyers, 
2014, 2016; Harvey, 2016; Wallace, 2011/2016; Repetti, 2010b, 2012a, 2012b, 2014, 
2015, 2016c). Kasulis (1985), borrowing a concept from Taoism, describes it as wu wei 
(doing without doing). Wallace (2011 p. 231/2016 p. 121) describes it similarly: “One 
non-conceptually rests in this timeless, pristine awareness, allowing actions to arise 
spontaneously and effortlessly, aroused by the interplay of one’s own intuitive wisdom 
and the needs of sentient beings.” The paradox of agentless agency will not be resolved 
here, but need not be. For it involves freedom not of the will but from it—more 
specifically, from its adharmic elements; compassion, generosity, and other forms of care 
involve volition present in enlightened beings (Repetti, 2010b). 
Rather than puzzle over the metaphysics, B. Alan Wallace (2011/2016) sees the 
Buddhist tradition taking a pragmatic approach, exploring ways we can acquire greater 
freedom to make choices conducive to well-being, and describing practices of Mahāyāna 
Buddhism that point toward mental freedom. One is the cultivation of the ability to 
deliberately focus attention with continuity and clarity; another is the cultivation of 
insight into how attitudes shape experience, allowing for the possibility of altering not 
only the way we experience but how we are influenced by memory. Wallace’s 
pragmatism rests on a liberating form of Mahāyāna metaphysics: the Great Perfection 
school of Tibetan Buddhism, emphasizing the realization of the substrate dimension of 
consciousness—pristine awareness—transcending conceptualization and the causal nexus 
(and its determinism/indeterminism dichotomy). Wallace sees this as the ultimate source 
of freedom and the ultimate nature of human identity. 
As alluring as this transcendental picture is, Wallace’s interpretation of the 
substrate consciousness is disputed even within Tibetan Buddhism, and to my thinking 
this model resembles strong free will as a causality-transcendent consciousness from 
which free actions originate. Metaphysics aside, Wallace’s pragmatic insight seems 
plausible: Buddhist practices at least support a weak (compatibilist) view of free will. 
14.3. Story, Rāhula, Gómez, and Kalupahana: Wiggly Buddhist 
Determinism 
Before we continue, let me unpack some terms. Compatibilist may be applied to the 
traditional Western sense of compatibility between free will and determinism but also to 
compatibility between Buddhist causation and impersonal agency required for moral 
cultivation on the path. Fischer (2006) argues that a strong conception of free will 
presupposes ability to do otherwise under identical causal circumstances, implying 
indeterminism (incompatible with determinism), but that moral responsibility is 
compatible with determinism, as Frankfurt (1969) argued: an agent can freely do X even 
if determined to, if the agent would have done X even if she could have done otherwise. 
Fischer adds, so long as she was able to respond to (moral) reasons for or against doing 
X, she is morally responsible regarding X. Semicompatibilists consider determinism 
incompatible with strong free will (which requires indeterminism) but compatible with 
moral responsibility or weak free will (which does not require indeterminism). I extend 
semicompatible to the broader sense of thinking Buddhist causation (and metaphysics) is 
incompatible with strong agency but compatible with weak agency and moral 
responsibility. On my analysis, most Buddhists writing on free will are 
semicompatibilists. 
The earliest Buddhist philosophers in the contemporary period to consider 
Buddhist views of free will, Frances Story (1976), Walpola Rāhula (1974), Luis Gómez 
(1975), and David Kalupahana (1976, 1992, 1995), presented the Buddhist perspective 
within the narrow parameters of the traditional question whether free will is consistent 
with determinism (see also Griffiths, 1982). I have reviewed their contributions at length 
elsewhere (Repetti, 2010a), so here I will only summarize my analysis. These 
philosophers agree that Buddhist causation, dependent origination (the view that all 
conditioned phenomena are dependent on earlier or simultaneous conditions), is neither 
purely deterministic nor indeterministic: the Buddha’s remarks about karma resemble 
determinism but resist a purely deterministic characterization, as does the broader 
doctrine of dependent origination. For these reasons, they consider Buddhist causation to 
involve what I have described as “wiggly determinism” (Repetti, 2010a), affording 
Buddhism a middle way between determinism and indeterminism, forming an opaque 
form of compatibilism between free will and causation that is probably semicompatibilist. 
These thinkers are not alone among Buddhists who view dependent origination as 
involving the nonnecessitated regularities Hume described as mere “constant 
conjunctions,” nor in thinking this circumvents the determinism/indeterminism 
dichotomy: if determined, they are unfree; if random, they cannot be authored (see, e.g., 
Garfield, 2001). However, as I have argued at length (Repetti, 2010a), if a form of 
causation is not purely deterministic, then by simple negation it is indeterministic. It may 
be misleading to try to understand Buddhism through Western frameworks (Garfield, 
2015; Heim, 2014), but it is doubtful that dependent origination can escape this 
dichotomy via wiggly determinism, Humean regularism, or other Buddhist causal 
models, such as Mahāyāna interdependence.13 Either the causation is deterministic or it is 
not: if the former, then the causes of decisions originate prior to the agent; if the latter, 
the agent cannot claim to author them. In principle, because Buddhists don’t believe in 
the agent/self, they ought not to care, but that doesn’t obliterate the problem. Let’s 
consider more recent views. 
14.4. Flanagan, Garfield, and Gowans: Buddhist Free Will 
Skepticism and Quietism 
Owen Flanagan (2016) argues against bringing Buddhism into discourse with free will 
conceptions tainted by their genesis within a monotheistic theodicy Buddhism lacks. 
Likewise, Garfield (2014/2016) asserts Mādhyamikas (followers of Madhyamaka, 
Middle-Way Buddhism) lack a free will theory because they lack a monotheistic 
theodicy, a conception of the agent operating outside the causal nexus, and a 
deterministic model of causation. However, in addition to the Buddha’s own rejection of 
inevitablism and the free will dialectical warrant generated thereby, Madhyamaka 
endorses the view that because there is no metaphysical foundation enabling the naive 
realist’s worldview to be reduced or eliminated, it makes as much sense to say there are 
tables as to say there are table-like phenomenological appearances or that they are 
aggregates of atomic psychophysical tropes. Likewise it (arguably) makes as much sense 
to say people have free will. 
Additionally both views flirt with the genetic fallacy insofar as they suggest that 
the notion of free will is illegitimate outside a theistic context because it has a theistic 
genesis. By analogy, however, if the concept of human rights had its historical genesis in 
Abrahamic doxography, arguendo, that would not necessarily invalidate the concept. 
Both thinkers also emphasize that Buddhism lacks a God concept, but that is neither 
entirely true nor entirely persuasive. It is not entirely true because there are gods in 
Buddhism, though they are mostly seen as caught within the karmic web like anyone else, 
and thus soteriologically unnecessary (exceptions involving Buddhist deities 
notwithstanding).14 And it is not persuasive because free will may obtain whether or not 
there is a God (Fischer, 1989). 
Christopher Gowans (2016) places the metaquestion, how to think about 
Buddhism and free will, into the context of its historical absence (see also Gowans 2014). 
Gowans argues that the main reason for Buddhist quietism here is that Buddhist 
philosophical analysis is limited by soteriological parameters: whatever promotes 
enlightenment. Gowans concludes that if Buddhism must pronounce on any theoretical 
position, it would only be justified as “skillful means” (soteriologically instrumental for 
certain individuals) but would nevertheless remain silent on the metaphysics. 
However, the Buddha’s rejection of inevitablism seems soteriologically relevant 
and explicitly pronouncing on metaphysics. Additionally a Buddhist meta-ethical theory 
would be soteriologically justified, yet Buddhism has none, historically. Also, whatever 
justifies extant Buddhist theories of intentionality, phenomenology, and so on 
conceivably justifies free will theory. I have argued that Buddhism prescribes methods 
for cultivating virtuoso-level abilities associated with free will (Repetti, 2010b, 2015, 
2016c). This view is implicit if not explicit in the works of several Buddhist scholars 
(Adam, 2010, 2016; Federman, 2010; Harvey, 2007, 2016; Wallace, 2011/2016; Meyers, 
2014, 2016; McRae, 2016; Friquegnon, 2016; Abelson, 2016). Intuitively, if the ārya has 
greater free will–related skills than the average person, she has greater free will, which 
increases, paradoxically, proportionate to the decrease in the self-sense and peaks in 
nirvāṇa, the cessation of the self-sense. I have argued that this skill undermines the most 
powerful free will skepticism, “hard incompatibilism” (Repetti, 2010b, 2015), the view 
that there is no autonomy regardless of whether or not we are determined, because either 
we are determined and not responsible for our choices, or we’re not determined, and our 
choices are not up to us. 
Derk Pereboom (2001) is a vocal advocate of hard incompatibilism, and Galen 
Strawson (1994) has advanced an abstract version of it with his “impossibility argument” 
that, irrespective of the causes of our mental states, whenever we choose, we are 
conditioned by the mental state we are in at the choice moment; because we cannot be the 
cause of our first mental state, we cannot be responsible for whatever mental state we are 
in at the choice moment, and thus it’s impossible for us to be responsible for our choices. 
Our virtuoso, however, can escape from previous and present mental state conditioning, 
irrespective of its causal history. That āryas are able to cultivate skills that theoretically 
defeat the most powerful forms of free will skepticism justifies a Buddhist free will 
theory, if only for the explanatory purchase this exhibits on behalf of Buddhism. As 
Meyers (2016) put the point, Buddhism rejects the notion of autonomous agents but 
asserts abilities greater than those that would be possessed by them. 
14.5. Meyers: Buddhist Semi-compatibilism 
Like other writers in this area (Heim, 2014; Garfield, 2014/2016, 2015; Flanagan, 2016), 
Meyers (2016) acknowledges that the Buddhist and Western frameworks for agency are 
orthogonal (see also Meyers, 2014). But Meyers argues adeptly for what, on my analysis, 
counts as a semicompatibilist view, what may be called “agency lite,” grounded in the 
works of the Abhidharma philosopher Vasubandhu. Paying very careful attention to the 
texts but informed significantly by Western analytic philosophy, Meyers critically 
examines Vasubandhu’s (and his contemporaries’) theories of karma, causation, and 
liberation and how they differ from modern positions on free will (and the views of other 
Buddhists), but also how they describe an understanding of mind, agency, and action that 
is compatible with causation: everything is caused (perhaps not explicitly 
deterministically). Meyers concludes not only that mental qualities explain what we 
consider free will and ground an understanding of moral responsibility but that Buddhist 
training increases abilities typically associated with free will in the West, to the virtuoso 
level, a claim I have also developed in some detail (Repetti, 2010b, 2015, 2016d). 
Meyers acknowledges the importance of the two truths doctrine in Buddhist 
thinking about free will, however implicit. Ultimately there is no agent/self, but 
conventionally individuals exhibit features typically considered sufficient for holding 
them responsible; that is, they are able to deliberate, consider consequences, approve or 
disapprove their intentions, restrain or allow various intentions to form actions, and so 
forth. Moreover āryas possess these abilities in far greater measure than the average 
person, and the Buddhist path requires them. Meyers’s account counts as 
semicompatibilist: ultimately all behavior is impersonally caused; thus there is no 
genuine free will in ultimate reality, but conventionally individuals typically possess 
sufficient proximal control to qualify for moral responsibility. 
14.6. Goodman: Buddhist Hard Determinism 
Disagreeing, Charles Goodman (2002) argues forcefully that Buddhism is hard 
deterministic: dependent origination is deterministic, and determinism rules out free will; 
he also argues that because there is no self, there cannot be an autonomous self, and thus 
there cannot be autonomy. I think the latter inference is faulty: by analogy, just because it 
follows from the fact that there are no unicorns that there cannot be any winged unicorns, 
it does not follow that there cannot be any wings. 
Goodman and Siderits have argued for opposing interpretations of Śāntideva’s 
remarks in the Bodhicaryāvatāra at 6:22–32, where, on the one hand, Śāntideva advises 
the aspirant to view others’ aggression as analogous to the liver’s production of bile 
(impersonally), for purposes of self-control, but, on the other hand, when considering the 
objection that because there is no self, there is nobody who can control the self, 
Śāntideva suggests that the perspective of self-control is required for the path. Siderits 
(2008/2016) largely bases his “paleo-compatibilism” on Śāntideva’s latter remark, 
whereas Goodman (2002, 2009) rejects that interpretation. 
Goodman’s argument rests on the Buddhist view that blame is a cognitive error, 
given that no nonself could be ultimately responsible for “its” behavior. However, 
Goodman (2016) has recently conceded a small point in the other direction. Echoing 
Gowans (2016), he now argues that the doctrine of skillful means might sanction belief in 
free will for individuals at certain stages of the Buddhist path. Goodman’s concession, 
however, resembles a Platonic “Noble Lie” more than an acceptance of compatibilism. 
Incompatibilism presupposes a strong view of free will according to which one 
can be free only if one’s choices are contracausal (they could have been otherwise under 
identical causal conditions), something possible only in an indeterministic world. 
However, there are weaker, compatibilist conceptions of free will, according to which an 
agent is free just in case she exhibits the right sort of abilities (which may be 
deterministic), for example, reason-responsiveness, higher-order approval of lower-order 
volitions. Goodman’s rejection of free will is restricted to strong free will.15 Not all 
Buddhists deal only with the strong conception of free will. However, even some who do 
deal with the strong conception derive opposite conclusions, such as Siderits. 
14.7. Siderits: Buddhist Paleo-compatibilism 
Siderits’s is one of the earliest, seminal, and lasting voices in the contemporary dialectic 
on Buddhist views of free will. Siderits calls his view “paleo-compatibilist,” but I identify 
it as semicompatibilist, to use a term more readily recognizable within the Western 
philosophical literature (Repetti, 2012a). Like most Buddhists writing on free will, 
Siderits’s view rests on the two truths doctrine. Conventionally there are persons, but 
ultimately (within Abhidharma reductionism) there are only deterministic atomistic 
psychophysical tropes. Siderits argues that ultimately, where determinism applies, there 
are no agents, but conventionally, where persons obtain, some exhibit strong free will. 
Siderits’s views on the specifics are highly complex and equally problematic 
(Repetti, 2012a). A better way to understand Siderits’s view is to classify it as a form of 
semicompatibilism: ultimately there’s no free will; conventionally there is. It would be 
more parsimonious to say we have weak free will. However, interlevel compatibilism—
between ultimate and conventional levels—is not the same as intralevel compatibilism, 
but the traditional debate is intralevel. Thus this sort of approach doesn’t fully resolve the 
problem, but rather repartitions it.16 
14.8. Coseru and Abelson: Buddhist Ethics without Agency? 
Some philosophers have posed problems for Buddhist ethics involving free will. 
Christian Coseru (2016), for example, asks whether Buddhism may consistently describe 
its ideal of agent-neutral negative consequentialist ethics (espoused by certain 
authoritative Buddhist philosophers; Goodman, 2009) and its impersonal causal model. 
Coseru argues that Śāntideva, by allowing moral rules to be discarded for skillful means 
(arguably a consequentialist principle), compromises the notion of responsibility that 
requires a freedom that is responsive to moral reasons. 
Coseru challenges the compatibilist idea that if we dispense with strong free will, 
a weaker notion of responsibility, informed by cognitive science (say, “responsibility 
lite”), will do, suggesting our traditional notion of moral-responsibility-entailing strong 
free will needs revision. Responsibility-entailing conduct prescribed in the Buddhist path 
(and the altruistic bodhisattva ideal) demands that moral norms be endorsed 
independently of empirical research. If skillful means implies agent-neutral 
consequentialism, this implies actions can be effective outside the interdependent web of 
causation—but such an account jeopardizes the responsibility-entailing relation between 
freedom and the bodhisattva’s aspirations. Thus Buddhist ethics and metaphysics seem 
incompatible with traditional conceptions of responsibility-entailing agency. Coseru is 
implicitly insisting on a strong conception of free will in the robust moral-responsibility-
entailing sense that is inconsistent with the sort of consequentialism implicit especially in 
later Buddhism’s bodhisattva ideal. 
However, as I have argued (in chorus with the others mentioned earlier), 
Buddhism seems quite capable of accommodating revised notions of agency lite and 
responsibility lite. Whether or not strong free will and moral responsibility are necessary 
needs to be shown. Ben Abelson seems to agree, mostly. On Abelson’s (2016) analysis of 
Buddhist reductionism, persons are impersonal psychophysical processes with only 
conventional existence. Buddhist reductionists, for Siderits (2003), are committed to this 
“Impersonal Description” (ID) thesis. Siderits defends against the charge (leveled by 
Strawson, 1986) that the ID thesis implies the extreme claim (among others) that holding 
people responsible cannot be rationally justified. Abelson focuses on Siderits’s reply to 
this objection, which appeals to “shifting coalitions” of self-revision processes (in the 
absence of a real self) as grounds for rendering responsibility attributions rational. 
Abelson argues that while this idea disarms Strawson’s objection, it cannot account for 
the robust responsibility Siderits wants, though it grounds a modest responsibility 
stronger than the sort Siderits (and Coseru) dismisses as too weak. Abelson applies this 
analysis to support a form of weak free will consistent with Buddhism. 
14.9. Strawson and Blackmore: No Phenomenological Self 
Galen Strawson was one of the first Western philosophers to link the Buddhist view of 
the unreality of the self with the unreality of free will. Strawson’s (1994) free will 
skepticism rests on his impossibility argument, which he takes to refute strong free will. 
In his most recent work on the subject, Strawson (2016) focuses on only one lemma of 
that argument, determinism, and how even determinists find determinism hard to 
assimilate into their daily lives. Unlike Peter Strawson (1962), who argued that we cannot 
adopt the skeptical perspective because it’s too alien to our interpersonal reactive 
attitudes (e.g., resentment), Galen Strawson (“Strawson,” except when Peter Strawson is 
being mentioned) thinks Buddhism represents a way of life that embodies that 
perspective. 
Strawson proposes a thought experiment whereby we are to continuously attempt 
to attend to the impersonal causation of each thought, desire, and so on to bring the 
resilience of our habitual agential thinking to light. When we see how we cannot maintain 
the impersonal perspective, we are advised to take up meditation, thought to reduce the 
gravitational pull of agential thinking. But Strawson’s prescription—meditate to 
eliminate the self-sense—seems premature. Prognosis rightly precedes prescription. 
Before we prescribe free will’s postmortem procedures, we must be sure free will is dead 
(Repetti, 2016b). 
Regardless, Susan Blackmore (2016) describes how she embodies in her daily life 
the sort of view Strawson prescribes for the postmortem existence of the nonagent. 
Blackmore claims that meditation has contributed to her nonagential experience, 
confirming Strawson’s assertion, disconfirming Peter Strawson’s. This raises a 
metaquestion. Meditative awareness resembles phenomenological reduction, as Coseru 
(2012) shows, in which conceptual proliferation is bracketed. Does meditation render 
agency invisible or, worse, disassemble it—a kind of psychic suicide practice? It would 
be enough of an error to conclude something doesn’t exist because one cannot, under 
certain circumstances, experience it, but quite another to bring about its nonexistence 
through such circumstances. 
According to Aaronson (2004), progress along the meditative path increases the 
conventional (psychologically functional) sense of agency, say, “self lite,” while 
diminishing the ultimate (metaphysically substantive) sense, the ātman. The self lite’s 
self-regulative abilities constitute weak (compatibilist) free will. The conventional self 
becomes more functionally integrated along the path, not less (Harvey, 2007, 2016; 
Meyers, 2016; Repetti, 2010b, 2015). For Blackmore (2016), belief in strong free will 
diminishes with progress along the meditative path, but what Blackmore seemingly 
misses is that weak free will increases. 
14.10. Aaronson, Harvey, and Adam: Two Senses of Self-Agency 
Concurring, Peter Harvey (2010) has argued that the Buddhist path not only presupposes 
a conventional form of weak free will but seems to strengthen our conventional free will. 
More recently, Harvey (2016) claims the Buddhist version of the free will problem 
concerns whether its impersonal conception of the person is compatible with moral-
responsibility-entailing agency, an issue we saw taken up by others (Coseru, 2016; 
Siderits, 2003; Strawson, 1986; Abelson, 2016; Meyers, 2014, 2016). Restricting his 
analysis to Theravāda Buddhism, Harvey (2007, 2016) emphasizes that the Theravāda 
view identifies various factors that increase conventional agency. Harvey concludes that 
Theravāda is compatibilist, a middle way between seeing a person as so impersonally 
conditioned as to lack the proximal agency ordinarily understood as required for 
responsibility and seeing the person as a strong agent/self with strong free will. His 
account resembles Aaronson’s (2004) and seems semicompatibilist in both senses: He 
actually calls his view semicompatibilist (Harvey, 2016). 
Martin T. Adam (2010, 2016) concurs with what seems clearly a 
semicompatibilist line of thought, based on an analysis of the Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta 
(Discourse on the Character of Non-Self) and an application of the views of Frankfurt 
(1971). Adam argues that the Buddha’s views and those in the Pāli sutras are 
incompatible with strong free will, but not weak free will or moral responsibility. He 
argues that Frankfurt’s distinctions, between freedom of the person, of the will, and of 
action, suggest that Buddhist freedom admits of degrees—as most would agree—relative 
to the individual’s spiritual development. Frankfurt distinguishes between freedom of the 
will (volitional/metavolitional harmony) and freedom of action (being able to act on 
one’s volitions), not to define freedom of the person (he says nothing about this) but 
rather personhood: a person is a being with a hierarchically structured will.17 Apart from 
these minor differences, Adam’s view comes close to my own. 
14.11. Federman, McRae, and Repetti: Approaching 
Agentlessness, Agency Increases 
Finally, a promising turn in recent scholarship involves attention to ways in which 
Buddhist practices afford practitioners abilities claimed to constitute skills significantly 
greater than those typically associated with free will, to control all mental states—even 
the powerful emotions treated as exculpatory in Buddhist ethics, for example, when an 
ārya experiences rage.18 This growing body of literature is both historically and textually 
grounded and empirically informed. 
For example, Asaf Federman (2010), focusing on early Buddhist texts, analyzes 
the Buddha’s rejection of inevitable causation and of the ātman, and he considers the 
importance of the many self-regulative abilities cultivated on the path, from which he 
concludes that Buddhism endorses a form of compatibilism. Focusing on Tibetan texts, 
however, Emily McRae (2016) seems to come to a similar conclusion. McRae explores 
how we can exercise choice regarding emotional experiences and dispositions, the sorts 
of things we typically experience as instinctive, deeply conditioned, if not mostly 
inevitable (see also McRae, 2012, 2015). McRae argues that we can choose our emotions 
because we can intervene in them. Drawing on mind training practices advocated by 
Tsongkhapa, McRae argues that Tsongkhapa’s analysis shows that successful 
intervention in negative emotional experiences depends on four factors: intensity of the 
emotional experience, ability to pay attention to the workings of one’s mind and body, 
knowledge of intervention practices, and insight into the nature of emotions. 
McRae argues that this makes sense of Tsongkhapa’s seemingly contradictory 
claims that the meditator can and should control (and eventually abandon) her anger and 
desire to harm others, and that harm-doers are “servants to their afflictions,” a tension we 
saw earlier in the debate between Goodman and Siderits regarding Śāntideva’s analogy 
about bile and aggression. McRae concludes by considering the (I think 
semicompatibilist) implications of Tsongkhapa’s account of choice in emotional life for 
the place of free will in Buddhism. 
I agree with these latter thinkers and conclude that analysis of Buddhist practices 
that engender mental freedom increase—and thereby demonstrate—a form of weak free 
will sufficient for responsibility lite. From a Buddhist perspective, to the extent we—
particularly Westerners—exercise certain capacities associated with free will (i.e., acting 
unreflectively on desires), we tend to decrease our mental freedom because doing as we 
please strengthens ego-based habit patterns that fortify the chief culprit in our suffering, 
the false sense of self. Conversely, as we increase mental freedom from the ego-volitional 
complex, we increase self-regulative ability, strengthening will, and subsequently 
exercising will less in the service of the ego-complex. Thus the closer one gets to mental 
freedom, the greater one’s self-regulative (autonomous) abilities, but—and here’s the 
paradoxical rub—as one attains the limit condition of mental freedom (nirvāṇa), one 
reaches maximal self-regulative ability, but there is no longer any sense of self, no ego-
based volitional complex, in need of regulation. Thus the maximum of mental freedom 
(nirvāṇa) and of self-regulation (weak free will) coincide with the absence of any sense 
of self, agentless agency—a form of reason-responsiveness that is entirely dharmic: 
dharma responsiveness. 
Reason-responsiveness is a central criterion in semicompatibilist accounts 
(Fischer, 2006); dharma-responsiveness grounds a Buddhist form of semicompatibilism. 
As Buddhist practitioners become increasingly dharmic (through soteriological practice), 
they not only increasingly approximate (or, on some views, instantiate) nirvāṇa; they also 
increasingly exhibit weak free will. But that increasingly powerful will is explicitly 
constructed for the sole purpose of eradicating the illusion of a metaphysically 
substantive agent/self, ironically, and vanishes upon its attainment of that goal. 
References 
Aaronson, H. B. (2004). Buddhist practice on Western ground: Reconciling Eastern 
ideals and Western psychology. London: Shambhala. 
Abelson, B. (2016). Shifting coalitions, free will, and the responsibility of persons. In R. 
Repetti (Ed.), Buddhist perspectives on free will: Agentless agency? (pp. 148–57). 
London: Routledge/Francis & Taylor. 
Adam, M. (2010). No self, no free will, no problem: Implications of the Anattalakkhaṇa 
Sutta for a perennial philosophical issue. Journal of the International Association 
of Buddhist Studies, 33, 239–265. 
Adam, M. (2016). Degrees of freedom: The Buddha’s views on the (im)possibility of free 
will. In R. Repetti (Ed.), Buddhist perspectives on free will: Agentless agency? 
(pp. 123–32). London: Routledge/Francis & Taylor. 
Blackmore, S. (2016). Living without free will. In R. Repetti (Ed.), Buddhist perspectives 
on free will: Agentless agency? (pp. 84–91). London: Routledge/Francis & 
Taylor. 
Caruso, G. (Ed.). (2013). Exploring the illusion of free will and moral responsibility. 
New York: Lexington Books. 
Coseru, C. (2012). Perceiving reality: Consciousness, intentionality, and cognition in 
Buddhist philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Coseru, C. (2016). Freedom from responsibility: Agent-neutral consequentialism and the 
bodhisattva ideal. In R. Repetti (Ed.), Buddhist perspectives on free will: 
Agentless agency? (pp. 92–105). London: Routledge/Francis & Taylor. 
Cozort, D. (1986). Highest yoga tantra: An introduction to the esoteric Buddhism of 
Tibet. Boulder, CO: Snow Lion. 
Federman, A. (2010). What kind of free will did the Buddha teach? Philosophy East and 
West, 60(1), 1–19. 
Fischer, J. M. (Ed.). (1989). God, freedom, and foreknowledge. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 
Fischer, J. M. (2006). My way: Essays on moral responsibility. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Flanagan, O. (2016). Negative dialectics in comparative philosophy: The case of 
Buddhist free will quietism. In R. Repetti (Ed.), Buddhist perspectives on free 
will: Agentless agency? (pp. 59–71). London: Routledge/Francis & Taylor. 
Frankfurt, H. (1969). Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. Journal of 
Philosophy, 66(23), 829–839. 
Frankfurt, H. (1971). Freedom of the will and the concept of the person. Journal of 
Philosophy, 68, 5–20. 
Friquegnon, M. (2016). Buddhism and free will. In R. Repetti (Ed.), Buddhist 
perspectives on free will: Agentless agency? (pp. 106–12). London: 
Routledge/Francis & Taylor. 
Garfield, J. (2001). Nagarjuna’s theory of causality: Implications sacred and profane. 
Philosophy East and West, 51(4), 507–524. 
Garfield, J. (2014). Just another word for nothing left to lose: Freedom of the will in 
Madhyamaka. In M. R. Dasti & E. F. Bryant (Eds.), Free will, agency and 
selfhood in Indian philosophy (pp. 164–185). New York: Oxford University 
Press. Reprinted in R. Repetti (Ed.), Buddhist perspectives on free will: Agentless 
agency? (pp. 45–58). London: Routledge/Francis & Taylor, 2016. 
Garfield, J. (2015). Engaging Buddhism: Why it matters to philosophy. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Gier, N. F., & Kjellberg, P. (2004). Buddhism and the freedom of the will: Pali and 
Mahayanist responses. In J. K. Campbell, M. O’Rourke, & D. Shier (Eds.), 
Freedom and determinism (pp. 277–304). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Gómez, L. O. (1975, January). Some aspects of the free-will question in the Nikāyas. 
Philosophy East & West, 25(1), 81–90. 
Goodman, C. (2002). Resentment and reality: Buddhism on moral responsibility. 
American Philosophical Quarterly, 39(4), 359–372. 
Goodman, C. (2009). Consequences of compassion: An interpretation and defense of 
Buddhist ethics. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Goodman, C. (2016). Uses of the illusion of agency: Why some Buddhists should believe 
in free will. In R. Repetti (Ed.), Buddhist perspectives on free will: Agentless 
agency? (pp. 34–44). London: Routledge/Francis & Taylor. 
Gowans, C. (2014). Buddhist moral philosophy: An introduction. London: Routledge. 
Gowans, C. (2016). Why the Buddha did not discuss “the problem of free will and 
determinism.” In R. Repetti (Ed.), Buddhist perspectives on free will: Agentless 
agency? (pp. 11–21). London: Routledge/Francis & Taylor. 
Griffiths, P. J. (1982). Notes toward a Buddhist critique of karmic theory. Religious 
Studies, 18, 277–291. 
Harvey, P. (2000). An introduction to Buddhist ethics: Foundations, values and issues. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Harvey, P. (2007). “Freedom of the will” in the light of Theravāda Buddhist teachings. 
Journal of Buddhist Ethics, 14, 35–98. 
Harvey, P. (2016). Psychological versus metaphysical agents: A Theravāda Buddhist 
view of free will and moral responsibility. In R. Repetti (Ed.), Buddhist 
perspectives on free will: Agentless agency? (pp. 158–69). London: 
Routledge/Francis & Taylor. 
Heim, M. (2014). The forerunner of all things: Buddhaghosa on mind, intention, and 
agency. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Kalupahana, D. J. (1976). Buddhist philosophy: A historical analysis. Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press. 
Kalupahana, D. J. (1992). A history of Buddhist philosophy: Continuities and 
discontinuities. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 
Kalupahana, D. J. (1995). Ethics in early Buddhism. Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press. 
Kasulis, T. P. (1985). Zen action, Zen person. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 
McRae, E. (2012). A passionate Buddhist life. Journal of Religious Ethics, 40(1), 99–
121. 
McRae, E. (2015). Metabolizing anger: A Tantric Buddhist solution to the problem of 
moral anger. Philosophy East & West, 65(2), 466–484. 
McRae, E. (2016). Emotions and choice: Lessons from Tsongkhapa. In R. Repetti (Ed.), 
Buddhist perspectives on free will: Agentless agency? (pp. 170–81). London: 
Routledge/Francis & Taylor. 
Meyers, K. (2014). Free persons, empty selves: Freedom and agency in light of the two 
truths. In M. R. Dasti & E. F. Bryant (Eds.), Free will, agency, and selfhood in 
Indian philosophy (pp. 41–67). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Meyers, K. (2016). Grasping snakes: Reflections on free will, Samādhi, and Dharmas. In 
R. Repetti (Ed.), Buddhist perspectives on free will: Agentless agency? (pp. 182–
92). London: Routledge/Francis & Taylor. 
Pereboom, D. (2001). Living without free will. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Rāhula, W. (1974). What the Buddha taught. New York: Grove Press. 
Repetti, R. (2010a). Earlier Buddhist theories of free will: Compatibilism. Journal of 
Buddhist Ethics, 17, 279–310. 
Repetti, R. (2010b). Meditation and mental freedom: A Buddhist theory of free will. 
Journal of Buddhist Ethics, 17, 165–212. 
Repetti, R. (2012a). Buddhist reductionism and free will: Paleo-compatibilism. Journal of 
Buddhist Ethics, 19, 33–95. 
Repetti, R. (2012b). Buddhist hard determinism: No self, no free will, no responsibility. 
Journal of Buddhist Ethics, 19, 130–197. 
Repetti, R. (2014). Recent Buddhist theories of free will: Compatibilism and 
incompatibilism. Journal of Buddhist Ethics,19, 279–352. 
Repetti, R. (2015, October). Buddhist meditation and the possibility of free will. Science, 
Religion & Culture, 2(2), 81–98. 
Repetti, R (Ed.). (2016a). Buddhist perspectives on free will: Agentless agency? London: 
Routledge/Francis & Taylor. 
Repetti, R. (2016b). Hermeneutical koan: What is the sound of one Buddhist theory of 
free will? In R. Repetti (Ed.), Buddhist perspectives on free will: Agentless 
agency? (pp. 1–10). London: Routledge/Francis & Taylor. 
Repetti, R. (2016c). Why there ought to be a Buddhist theory of free will. In R. Repetti 
(Ed.), Buddhist perspectives on free will: Agentless agency? (pp. 22–33). London: 
Routledge/Francis & Taylor. 
Repetti, R. (2016d). Agentless agency: The soft compatibilist argument from Buddhist 
meditation, mind-mastery, evitabilism, and mental freedom. In R. Repetti (Ed.), 
Buddhist perspectives on free will: Agentless agency? (pp. 193–206). London: 
Routledge/Francis & Taylor. 
Siderits, M. (1987). Beyond compatibilism: A Buddhist approach to freedom and 
determinism. American Philosophical Quarterly, 24(2), 149–159. 
Siderits, M. (2003). Personal identity and Buddhist philosophy: Empty persons. 
Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. 
Siderits, M. (2008). Paleo-compatibilism and Buddhist reductionism. Sophia, 47(1), 29–
42. Reprinted in R. Repetti (Ed.), Buddhist perspectives on free will: Agentless 
agency? (pp. 133–47). London: Routledge/Francis & Taylor, 2016. 
Story, F. (1976). Dimensions of Buddhist thought: Essays and dialogues. Kandy, Sri 
Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society. 
Strawson, G. (1986). Freedom and belief. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Strawson, G. (1994). The impossibility of moral responsibility. Philosophical Studies, 
75(1–2), 5–24. 
Strawson, G. (2016). Free will and the sense of self. In R. Repetti (Ed.), Buddhist 
perspectives on free will: Agentless agency? (pp. 72–83). London: 
Routledge/Francis & Taylor. 
Strawson, P. F. (1962). Freedom and resentment. Proceedings of the British Academy, 
48, 1–25. 
Thakchoe, S. (2007). The two truths debate: Tsongkhapa and Gorampa on the middle 
way. Boston: Wisdom. 
Wallace, B. A. (2011). A Buddhist view of free will: Beyond determinism and 
indeterminism. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 18(3–4), 21–33. Reprinted in R. 
Repetti (Ed.), Buddhist perspectives on free will: Agentless agency? (pp. 113–22). 
London: Routledge/Francis & Taylor, 2016. 
                                                            
2 Buddhist scholars have only begun to discuss free will over the past 50 years, in 
conversation with Western philosophers. See Repetti (2010a, 2012a, 2012b, 2014) 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
for in-depth reviews of most of this literature; see Repetti (2016a) for a 
representative collection of this literature. 
4 Some of my observations here are taken from Repetti (2016b). 
6 See Garfield (2014/2016), Gowans (2014, 2016), Flanagan (2016), Repetti (2016c). See 
Strawson (2016) and Blackmore (2016) on the realization of that reality. 
7 Goodman (2002) argues along similar lines. 
8 Not all forms of libertarianism require supramundane conceptions. Meyers (2014, 2016) 
claims Buddhism is logically consistent with the more naturalistic “event-causal” 
libertarianism, and Wallace (2011/2016) describes enlightened action in a way 
that resembles libertarian descriptions (infra), his rejection of the strong 
conception of free will notwithstanding. 
9 Federman (2010) compares critiques of the dualistic Cartesian model of the self with 
Buddhist critiques of the then-prevalent view of the ātman (self/soul). 
10 Goodman (2002) and Wallace (2011/2016) may be interpreted as objecting to this 
equation, but Repetti (2012b, 2014) notes that the relevant element of 
resemblance—inevitability—suffices to show that the Buddha was not an 
inevitablist and that this is reason enough to think he was not a hard determinist. 
See also Federman (2010). 
11 Frankfurt (1971) would consider this volitional/metavolitional harmony sufficient for 
compatibilist free will and moral responsibility. For a fusion of Frankfurt’s 
hierarchical model and Fischer’s reason-responsiveness model with features of 
ārya agency, see Repetti (2010b). 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
12 See Thakchoe (2007) for a comprehensive analysis and explication of the two truths 
doctrine. 
13 See Repetti (2012a, 2012b) for critiques of these attempts. 
14 See Cozort (1986) on Tibetan deity yoga. 
15 For an in-depth critique of Goodman’s (2002) earlier position, see Repetti (2012b). 
16 For an extensive critical review of Siderits’s arguments, see Repetti (2012a). 
17 I have argued (Repetti, 2010b) that the sort of freedom constituted by enlightenment 
involves freedom from the otherwise conditioned nature of the ego-volitional 
complex, or freedom from the self, and that Frankfurt’s metavolitional/volitional 
model of freedom of will may be usefully applied to identify the sort of self-
regulative abilities that increase as the ārya cultivates dharmic intentions and 
deconditions from adharmic ones. 
18 See Harvey (2007) for a rich discussion of a spectrum of like cases taken from the Pāli 
canon. 
